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FRANCE À FRIC: THE CFA ZONE IN AFRICA AND NEOCOLONIALISM  
 
Over fifty years after 1960’s “Year of Africa,” most of Francophone Africa continues to 
be embedded in a set of associations that fit very well with Kwame Nkrumah’s 
description of neocolonialism, where postcolonial states are de jure independent but in 
reality constrained through their economic systems so that policy is directed from 
outside. This article scrutinizes the functioning of the CFA, considering the role the 
currency has in persistent underdevelopment in most of Francophone Africa. In doing so, 
the article identifies the CFA as the most blatant example of functioning neocolonialism 
in Africa today and a critical device that promotes dependency in large parts of the 
continent. Mainstream analyses of the technical aspects of the CFA have generally 
focused on the exchange rate and other related matters. However, while important, the 




On the 20th January, 2019, the Italian deputy prime minister, Luigi di Maio, called on the 
European Union to impose sanctions on France for its policies in Africa. Di Maio went 
on to say that without Africa, France would rank 15th among world economies, not in the 
top six and he linked this situation specifically to the CFA currency, asserting that 
“France is one of those countries that by printing money for 14 African states prevents 
their economic development”.1 While Di Maio’s intervention arguably had more to do 
with tensions between the Italian and French governments, particularly over irregular 
migration from Africa, than a genuine critique of the currency, they did in fact feed into 
widespread and growing discontent within the continent and generated considerable 
discussion within and outside Africa vis-à-vis the CFA. 2  As BNP Paribas, France’s 
largest banking group, noted with some degree of understatement, ‘The CFA franc no 
longer enjoys unanimous support’.3      
Indeed, prior to Di Maio’s comments, at the end of August 2017, a Senegalese 
court acquitted a Franco-Beninese activist who had been charged over burning a 5,000 
CFA note in a protest against the currency. It was reported that ‘for most of the young 
people who attended the protest, his act was a legitimate sign of defiance against a 
currency they consider as a symbol of the economic and financial domination by France 
of the countries sharing it’.4 Less than a year later, in June 2018, ten musicians from 
seven African countries released a song entitled 7 minutes contre le CFA to mobilise 
  
opposition to the common currency. 5  Nearly forty years before these events, Tamar 
Golan asked how France could do everything that it does in Africa—and get away with it, 
including the currency arrangements that linked Paris to many of its former colonies.6 As 
Di Maio’s statement, the protest in Senegal and the music record attests, the answer to 
this question perhaps remains unanswered.  
 This article aims to present a critical analysis of the CFA zone, aiming to 
demonstrate how the CFA currency is a politico-economic tool of French neocolonial 
policy in Africa, maintained with the active connivance of Francophone elites on the 
continent.7 The article proceeds by sketching out the colonial origins of the CFA zone 
before moving on to scrutinize the functioning of the CFA. The way in which France 
holds an effective veto power on monetary decisions is elucidated, as well as the 
workings of the Operations Account and how capital generated by African economies is 
used to the benefit of French interests. How the CFA deepens underdevelopment and 
dependency within its areas is also discussed. The fact that the CFA as a currency union 
defies economic commonsense is deliberated, pointing to the central point that the CFA 
zone is, first and foremost, a political entity. While defenders of the CFA usually refer to 
the supposed stability of the currency, the credibility provided by the French Treasury 
and a relatively low inflation rate, the article concludes that the CFA is arguably the most 
blatant example of functioning neocolonialism in Africa today and a critical device that 
helps deepen dependency and underdevelopment in large parts of the continent. 
 
La Françafrique 
Of all the former colonial powers in Africa, France has retained the most intense political, 
social, economic and culturally intense ties after independence, early on recognized as 
being neocolonial in nature.8  Captured in the terms le village franco-africain 9  or la 
Françafrique,10 highly personalized networks underpin relations, which guarantee access 
to natural resources and markets in Africa for French interests.11 For French economic 
concerns, Africa is important, given that nuclear power accounts for 80% of French 
electricity production12  and uranium, sourced from Niger, is crucial. In addition, French 
industries depend specifically on CFA countries for imports of manganese, chromium 
and phosphates, minerals all essential for French aeronautics and weaponry production. 
  
For French corporations active in Africa, the fixed parity of the CFA franc, which is 
overvalued, means that these French interests are effectively protected from common 
currency deprecations, while the convertibility and free transfer principles facilitate their 
repatriation of profits out of the continent.13 Due to the overvalued nature of the currency 
(see below), French commercial interests are able to export and sell their products to the 
CFA at lower cost.  
Equally, France’s chasse gardée or domaine reserve on the continent grants Paris 
an international credibility it would not otherwise possess. 14  As Kako Nubukpo, 
professor of Economics at the Université de Lomé, Togo, notes, while African countries 
give up their monetary sovereignty, 
En contrepartie, à travers ce “paternalisme monétaire”, la France gagnerait en 
prestige, une illustration à la face du monde du maintien de l’empire, un pré 
carré au sein duquel son influence et son rayonnement resteraient entiers, à 
l’heure où la concurrence des pays émergents (Chine, Inde, Russie, Brésil) se fait 
plus vive que jamais.15 
 
This last point is perhaps now the most important factor in explaining Paris’ connections 
to the continent.16        
Over fifty years after 1960’s “Year of Africa,” most of Francophone Africa 
continues to be embedded in a set of associations that fit well with Kwame Nkrumah’s 
description of neocolonialism, whereby ‘the State which is subject to it is, in theory, 
independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its 
economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside’.17 On the basis of 
this description, neocolonialism is a system of domination and exploitation, invested and 
maintained by the former colonial power in which economic, financial and military 
instruments work for keeping in power well-disposed leaders and maintaining favourable 
policies which procure economic and financial advantages. 18  The saliency of neo-
colonialism remains a powerful as an analytical category to understand contemporary 
Africa’s political economy.19 
The result of such arrangements in much of Francophone Africa has been 
continued underdevelopment, understood here as the increasing loss by a society over 
  
control of its own future; the emergence of structures of external dependency in the 
economy; net transfers of resources and national wealth to foreigners; a growing gap 
between the dominated and dominant nations vis-à-vis technology, life chances and 
living standards and the consolidation of a domestic social structure whereby local elites 
benefit while the majority do not.20 The role of the African elites within the CFA zone in 
perpetuating this scenario, which is objectively against the interest of their own countries, 
cannot be underestimated.21 
From the time of independence onwards, Paris’ dominant presence in its former 
African empire has been based on three pillars. These are, namely, a network of French 
experts present at the state level of African countries, in financial, institutional, and 
educational structures. Secondly, the presence of French troops stationed in various 
military bases across the continent, as well as numerous French military advisers attached 
to African armies in senior advisory roles. 22  Finally, a monetary pillar through the 
Communautés Financières d’Afrique Franc (CFA), made up of two CFA currencies.23 
CFA is the common name for the two currencies circulating in the fourteen member 
countries of the zone, which is made up two economic communities.24 These are the 
Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale (CEEAC)25 and the Union 
économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA), both printed by the Banque de 
France in Chamalières in Auvergne-Rhône-Alpes.26 The outer convertibility of the CFA 
in both communities is guaranteed by the French Treasury (Trésor public).  
The first two pillars of Franco-African policy have been covered in depth.27 The 
third pillar, specifically CFA’s role in perpetuating underdevelopment and dependency 
has increasingly come under spotlight. Recent monographs on the subject have also 
reignited debate within Africa.28 This article seeks to add to the discussion.  
 
Origins of the CFA 
During the 1930s and 1940s, France established in each of its colonies currencies that 
were pegged to the French franc. 29  During the Second World War, those African 
territories under the control of the Free French (so-called Afrique Française Libre) issued 
banknotes, backed by the Caisse Centrale de la France Libre, an institute sanctioned to 
circulate currency (this institution moved to Algiers in 1943).30 After the war, overseas 
  
French currencies were consolidated into the Franc des Colonies Françaises d’Afrique 
(FCFA) and the Franc des Colonies Françaises du Pacifique.31 The motivation for this 
was that when Paris ratified the Bretton Woods Agreement in late 1945, the French franc 
was devalued so as to put a fixed exchange rate with the American dollar in place. Thus 
new currencies were established in French territories overseas to both protect them from 
the devaluation and, crucially, to facilitate exports to France to help Paris rebuild the 
country after the war,32 with Paris using the institutional arrangements to maintain their 
“right” to African natural resources.33 
 The very genesis of the CFA is colonial and even the division into two different 
CFAs tracks French imperial division of the continent.34 In 1959 the Banque Centrale des 
Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) was created and began issuing CFA Francs.35 A 
similar institution was established in Central Africa, the Banque Centrale des Etats de 
l’Afrique Equatoriale et du Cameroun (BCEAEC). Both of these were instituted on the 
eve of independence for most of France’s African colonies and thus ‘French West Africa 
and French Equatorial Africa disappeared, but France sought to maintain privileged and 
lasting political, cultural, economic, and military relations with the former colonies’.36  
The CFA franc zone operates under a number of basic operating norms: (i) a fixed 
parity against the euro, adjustable if needed, but only after consultation with Paris and the 
unanimous decision of all members within each monetary area; (ii) convertibility of the 
CFA franc into the euro; (iii) the guaranteeing of such convertibility by France through 
each regional central bank holding an operating account with the French Treasury in 
Paris; (iv) free capital mobility between the two CFA zones and France; and (v) the 
sharing of foreign exchange reserves of each regional monetary area.37 
The CFA franc was issued initially by the central bank for France’s overseas 
territories (Caisse Centrale de la France d’outre mer) before being moved, after the 
independence of most of its former African colonies, to two regional central banks. These 
banks, completely dominated by France until the early 1970s, eventually secured 
responsibility for issuing currency. The two different CFA currencies are legal tenders in 
their particular regional zones only. However, because of their convertibility into the 
euro, the free capital mobility between each CFA zone and Paris, and that the two CFA 
  
francs have an identical parity vis-à-vis the euro, the CFA franc zone has conventionally 
been regarded as one currency sphere with a single currency.  
Two agreements drafted in 1972-1973, following the devaluation of the French 
franc in 1969 by 12.5%, were signed.38 Cooperation Convention Articles 5 and 12 saw 
the French Treasury guarantee unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc at a fixed 
exchange rate with the French franc.39 A lack of de jure controls regarding capital flows 
within the zone facilitated this. In turn, the headquarters of the two CFA region’s 
respective central banks (BCEAO and BCEAEC) were symbolically moved from Paris to 
Dakar, Senegal and Yaoundé, Cameroon respectively. However, as one commentator 
noted at the time, ‘The CFA franc continues to be guaranteed by the French Treasury. 
Thus, for these West African States of French colonial legacy, BCEAO and CFA 
currency make their economies very dependent on France’.40 The main goal of the CFA 
arrangement was to construct a post-colonial architecture to establish continued French 
influence and protect Paris’ economic interests in terms of access to natural materials, as 
well as safeguard markets for French manufactured goods.41 The net result has been that 
the CFA franc has helped entrench its member countries’ dependent positions as 
relatively low-priced sources of raw materials. This has been primarily because the two 
CFA currencies were (and continue to be) set at an unreasonably high level, which 
limited the price competitiveness of exports onto global world markets (except when 
these exports went to the French market). Thus, ‘the parity was engineered in such a way 
as to make France’s market the exclusive outlet for her former colonies’ raw materials: 
cocoa, coffee, cotton, rubber, uranium, among others’.42 Continued underdevelopment 
and dependency has been the net result. 
 
France decides: the value of the CFA 
As noted, the CFA franc was officially born on December 26, 1945 with a parity of 1 
FCFA = 1.70 French francs.43 Its parity was later set (October 1948) at 0.5 CFA franc per 
French franc. This was because between 1945 and 1948, the CFA franc had tracked the 
devaluation of the French franc against the dollar. However, on 18 October 1948, the 
French franc was devalued further against the dollar as part of the Bretton Woods process 
and in response, the CFA franc was revalued against the French franc to counteract most 
  
of this later devaluation.44 These parities remained unchanged until January 1994 and the 
CFA franc was not again revalued against the French franc; it merely shadowed 
successive devaluations of the French franc.45  
On 1 January 1960 the French franc was redenominated. One hundred “old” 
francs became one “new” franc. Thus from this point onwards (until 1994), one CFA 
franc = 0.02 French franc. This radically changed on 12 January 1994 when there was a 
sharp devaluation of the CFA franc, ostensibly to promote exports from the CFA zone. 
One CFA franc then became 0.01 French francs. This devaluation was unilaterally 
announced by Paris with no consultation whatsoever with African leaders.46 According to 
one report, ‘Lors de la réunion destinée à informer les dirigeants africains de cette 
dévaluation, feu le président Bongo du Gabon et d’autres participants ont dit que les 
émissaires français n’avaient pas demandé leur avis aux chefs d’Etat réunis à Dakar et 
que tout ce qu’ils avaient à faire était de signer ce qui avait été décidé par Paris avec le 
soutien du Fonds monétaire international’.47 The decision was in line with the “doctrine 
of Abidjan” (also called the “Balladur doctrine”) announced in 1993 and which aligned 
French aid policies to neoliberal principles.48 
The devaluation created serious (albeit temporary) problems in Franco-African 
relations.49 The step also greatly aggravated economic instability in the CFA countries50 
and led to the CFA being in the short term undervalued by 23%.51 That the African 
leaders were not even informed about the devaluation of their own currencies, spoke 
volumes.52 As Agbohou notes, ‘The status of African member countries was clear: they 
were subjected to the monetary whims of the colonizer and thus sovereignty and 
independence were severely restricted’. 53  Meanwhile, the purchasing power of the 
population, particularly the lower classes, was reduced, thus intensifying poverty: prices 
increased by up to 30%.54 
 A second major overhaul of the CFA regime also occurred in 1994 when the CFA 
monetary unions were transformed into economic unions. Treaties were signed 
establishing the Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) and the 
Communauté Economique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale (CEMAC). UEMOA 
established an administrative board, consisting of two directors per member state and 
  
mandated the creation of “National Credit Committees.” The establishment of CEMAC 
also entailed the creation of a similar thirteen member administrative board.55  
The adoption of the euro by France in 1999 left the monetary agreement of the 
CFA zone largely unaffected.56 When joining the euro area, Paris assured Brussels that 
changes in the exchange rate of the CFA, or the inclusion of new members, would be 
conveyed in advance. Additionally, with the EU Council decision of 23 November 1998, 
any agreements that comprised the CFA arrangements did not imply any obligation for 
the European Central Bank to support the peg. Consequently, modeled on the Maastricht 
Treaty, which provided the basis for the European Monetary Union (EMU), ‘as if 
orthodox measures deemed appropriate for the Eurozone were universally applicable’,57 
on 1 January 1999, the euro replaced the franc and one hundred CFA francs were now 
valued at 0.152449 euro (or put another way, 1 euro = 655.957 CFA francs).  
Overall, the changes in both 1960 and 1999 were purely adjustments in the 
currency in use in France; the relative value of the CFA franc against either the French 
franc or the euro was only changed twice: once in 1948 and then in 1994. In summary, 
the parity of the CFA franc may be depicted as: 
 
CFA parity58 
Creation of the CFA December 26, 1945 1 FCFA = 1.70 FF 
Devaluation of French franc October 17, 1948 1 FCFA = 2.00 FF 
Introduction of new French Franc January 1, 1960 1 FCFA = 0.02 FF 
Devaluation of CFA January 12, 1994 1 FCFA = 0.01 FF 
Securing the CFA to euro January 1, 1999 655.957 FCFA = 1 euro 
 
The point of all of the above is that Paris was the decision maker every step of the way 
and the CFA member countries in Africa had minimal influence or, as Nkrumah put it, ‘A 
state in the grip of neocolonialism is not master of its own destiny’. 59  Notably, in 
December 2016, when CEMAC leaders met to discuss devaluing the currency (a proposal 
subsequently rejected), ‘The summit was held in the presence of IMF Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde and French finance minister Michel Sapin who were there to give 
suggestions on the way forward’. 60  Lagarde herself, of course, is French, being ex-
minister of Paris’ Ministère de l'économie et des finances. 
 
  
The ties that bind 
Intrinsic to the CFA arrangement have been the following obligations to African 
members of the zone. Firstly, CFA members are required to deposit a minimum of 65% 
of their international reserves into an Operations Account (compte d’opérations), located 
in Paris at the French Treasury (this ratio was modified for UEMOA in September 2005, 
when it became 50 percent). Secondly, members are required to provide exchange cover 
for a minimum of 20% of their sight liabilities i.e. the total deposits which are repayable 
on demand, not including savings account liabilities or the deposits of any other bank. 
Finally, members are obliged to place a cap on credit extended to each CFA member 
country, equivalent to 20 per cent of that country’s public revenue in the previous 
financial year.61 Since 2001, this imperative has changed and CFA countries requiring 
financing must go to the financial market and issue bonds. 
 The Operations Account is one of the most controversial aspects of the CFA. By 
stipulating the deposit of such a considerable percentage of CFA members’ foreign 
reserves into a French-directed (and operated) account located in Paris, member states 
have effectively handed control over their monetary policy to France. The central banks 
of the CFA zone do not themselves take on the fixed portion of their currencies with the 
euro; instead, it is the French Treasury (i.e. the State budget, not the Banque de France), 
which has the power. In exchange for convertibility, the foreign exchange reserves of the 
CFA members are consolidated. 62  CEMAC and UEMOA centralize their foreign 
exchange reserves with their own central banks, which are then obligated to deposit 50% 
with the French Treasury into the operations account in Paris. The external value of the 
CFA is thus entrusted with the former colonial power, in the former colonial capital. The 
net result is that control over the money supply, monetary and financial regulations and, 
ultimately, budgetary and economic policies, are in the hands of the former coloniser.  
Regarding the common account, no African country is able to say what part of the 
capital belongs to it. French policy disallows the disclosure of information regarding the 
investment of this capital by the French Treasury. CFA members are thus unaware where 
these funds are invested.63 Only France has the privilege to access this information and it 
is evident that the French Treasury profits from these currencies, investing the foreign 
  
reserves of the CFA states in its own name on the Paris Bourse. At the 55th independence 
celebrations in Chad in August 2015, President Idriss Déby asked publicly: 
Pourquoi cette monnaie n’est pas convertible? Pourquoi tous les échanges 
passent par la Banque de France? Qu’est-ce que nous gagnons en mettant nos 
ressources dans des comptes d’opérations? Quel est le taux d’intérêt que nous 
gagnons?64  
 
Thus the head of state of a CFA member, fifty-five years after the French apparently 
granted independence, publicly admitted that he did not know the interest earned by 
capital from his own country and deposited in Paris.65  
A careful examination of the current interest rate paid out by the French Treasury 
on CFA deposits offers a sharper clarification. In 2014, $20 billion of African money was 
held in trust by the French government in the Operations Account. This capital earned 
0.75 percent interest (which at the time of writing remains the current interest rate). Yet 
in that same year, interest rates in France varied from a high of 2.38% (in January) to a 
low of 0.92% (in December). At no point in 2014 did French interest rates pay out as low 
as the Operations Account did. The following year, as  Mar Bassin N'diaye (2016) noted, 
‘En 2015, la BCEAO et la BEAC ont été contraintes de confier au Trésor français 50% 
de leurs réserves, 6700 milliards de FCFA, et n’ont reçu que 45 milliards en intérêts’.66 
Thus the centralization of the currencies of the CFA zone and the lodging of a 
sizeable portion of their foreign reserves in France helps subsidize the French national 
budget and hence, French public debt i.e. ‘an attractive contribution to the liquid assets of 
France’.67 To what level, no-one knows, due to the secrecy about the account.68 It is 
unclear where the funds are invested, whether there is any profitable return on the 
investments, and where that profit goes (if there is any). It is alleged however that the 
reserves made up at least part of the French contribution to the loans given to failing 
Eurozone countries during the financial crash in 2008.69  
Furthermore, while the French Treasury disburses the capital generated by interest 
rates back to the central banks in the CFA zones, ‘this interest is included in the amount 
of French development aid funds given to African states’. 70  In short, much of what 
France purports to provide as “aid,” are actually funds originating from the recipients 
  
themselves, now only dressed up as French largesse. In addition, the bulk of French “aid” 
comes in the form of loans, which have to be paid back, with interest. France’s 2018 
ODA budget provided for $291 million in bilateral economic and financial aid to be 
disbursed by the Agence Française de Développement; of this, $216 million (74%) were 
loans. 71  The Operations Account is then a central element of the CFA zones’ 
underdevelopment, in that resources are being actively used, but used in ways which 
benefits France, not the dependent states from which the resources are sourced. 
To compound matters, CFA member states are unable to make use of this capital 
as collateral to obtain credit lines, as the exchange reserves are held in the name of the 
French Treasury. As will be detailed below, French representatives sit on the boards of 
both CFA central banks and thus a de facto French veto exists with regard to setting 
interest rates and monetary policy. This is a fundamental policy device for sovereign 
states, but which cannot be exercised by CFA members: ‘the CFA Franc Zones [are] 
beyond the features of a regular currency union’.72 Members are thus dependent on Paris 
to administer and control their own ostensible currency and lack a classic—and basic—
definition of state sovereignty.73   
Throughout its different expressions, the significant structural underpinnings of 
the CFA remain neocolonial. Indeed, the CFA is intrinsic to Françafrique, a reality that 
reflects the fact that the French ruling elites never equated decolonization with retreat, 
nor fully accepted the idea of African independence.74 As one analyst noted, ‘De Gaulle 
may not have regarded [the] transition to “international sovereignty” (as he preferred to 
call it) as fundamentally important; real independence in the modern world could be 
enjoyed only by ensembles organists, and he relied upon enlightened self-interest and the 
pressure of circumstances to keep most African leaders in step’.75 Remarkably, this has 
more or less remained today. Indeed, the CFA zone is a central element of a network of 
intricate webs of political, military, and financial linkages that have for practical purposes 
put the CFA zone under French control and entrenched dependency.76  
Central to this fact is that the unlimited convertibility of the CFA into French 
francs, guaranteed by the Treasury in Paris under Article VIII, Section 2a of the Bretton 
Woods Agreement, was dissimilar to the norms and settlements of convertibility which 
the Bretton Woods agreement rested upon.77 By this, it is meant that the CFA francs were 
  
not exchanged on the open currency market. The net result of this was that France 
enjoyed effective exclusive rights of access to the CFA zone and their primary 
commodity markets. This simply perpetuated ‘a lop-sided dependence on the export of 
raw materials, and the import of manufactured goods’.78 This structural dependence on 
one or two commodities can be most easily seen in CEMAC, which is disproportionately 
reliant on oil for its economic exports. 
 
CEMAC: Relative Economic Size and Importance of Oil Sector, 201579 
 GDP as % of 
CEMAC’s GDP 
Oil as % of GDP Oil exports as % of 
country’s exports 
Cameroon  38.7 4.7 38.5 
CAR 2.2 0.0  0.0 
Chad  14.8 20.0 78.0 
Congo-B 12.2 40.5 74.4  
Eq. Guinea 12.8 30.0 81.4 
Gabon 19.4 31.8 76.5  
 
Just prior to the slump in oil prices in mid-2014, the oil sector represented 29 percent of 
CEMAC’s GDP; 79 percent of its exports; and 54 percent of regional government 
revenue. A wider look at the economic structures of the two CFA zones’ members shows 
just how utterly dependent they are on primary commodities for their export income. This 
is important, given that the CFA currency is fixed at an overvalued rate, which favours 
the urban areas, which can buy imported goods relatively inexpensively but at the 
expense of farmers and other commodity producers.80 Equally, the high dependence on 
commodities with the CFA zones increases the prospect of asymmetric shocks and of 
pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour.81    
 
Three main exports, with their share in total exports, 201782 
  Product I Product II Product III 
Benin Non-crude oil (40.1%) Light oils (13.6%) Cotton (9.6%) 
Burkina Faso Gold (65.2%) Cotton (19.8%) 
 
Cameroon Fish (32.6%) 
  
  
CAR Wood (44.0%) Cotton (20.6%) Sawn wood (16.8%) 
Chad Crude oil (95.2%) 
  
Comoros Cloves (53.4%) Vanilla (14.5%) 
Sea vessels for 
breaking up (12.6%) 
Congo-B Crude oil (78.9%) 
Copper cathodes 
(9.9%)  
Côte d’Ivoire Cocoa (33.9%) Cocoa paste (7.6%) 
Cocoa butter, fat and 
oil (5.6%) 
Eq. Guinea Crude oil (68.2%) Natural gas (23.5%) 
 
Gabon Crude oil (81.3%) Manganese (8.5%) 
 
Guinea-B Cashew nuts (75.0%) Wood (19.8%) 
 
Mali Cotton (43.0%) Gold (34.2%) Sesame seeds (6.2%) 
Niger Light oils (32.3%) Non-crude oil (19.7%) 
Sesame seeds 
(16.2%) 
Senegal Gold (16.8%) Fish (10.3%) 
Phosphoric acid 
(7.3%) 




French colonialism inserted Paris’ African territories into the global system in a 
dependent position whereby extraction was the dominant mode of production; the CFA 
arrangement has perpetuated this reality. Commenting upon the UEMOA, the IMF 
recently stated that ‘Growth in the [UEMOA] has been lower and more volatile over the 
past 25 years than in comparable countries and the structure of the economy has changed 
little. The majority of the region’s population is employed in low-productivity agriculture 
and the secondary sector is underdeveloped’. 83  This is surely a comment of the 
continuing effects of the CFA. 
 A currency is a tool operated by a state (or group of states) to carry out 
programmes to further economic goals. As the problems with the euro have demonstrated 
within the European Union, if a currency hampers the accomplishment of such goals or is 
perceived to be damaging to the national good, policymakers question the virtue of such 
arrangements. Regarding the CFA, analysts have long interrogated the CFA fixed 
exchange rate parity and its effect on member countries’ economies.84 If policymakers 
indeed note that the arrangements are deleterious to the nation, they should, ‘in the best 
interests of their country or countries, contemplate an alternative to this currency and the 
  
monetary regime therewith associated’.85 This assumes however that the national good is 
a priority (or even on the list of priorities). In many of the CFA countries, this cannot by 
any means be assumed. Rather, for the ruling elites in the CFA zone, the fixed rate has 
been beneficial for them and is part of the membership dues for Françafrique. 
Furthermore, French businesses have benefited from the CFA zone whilst the main 
advantage to Paris is political in that with fourteen African countries within the orbit of 
France, it can claim to be a global power. The mutual interests between French and local 
ruling elites in the CFA countries thus come together to promote a high degree of inertia 
with regard to reconsidering the arrangement. Otherwise, ‘Very few economic rationales, 
if any, could justify such a (misaligned) rate that has hurt and continues to impact 
negatively the economies of these countries’.86  
 The status quo is further solidified by the governance arrangements which have 
been mentioned previously, but serves to prevent any effective change. At the BEAC, the 
Board of Directors is made up of thirteen members, with three representing France; the 
BCEAO board has eighteen members, two of whom are appointed by Paris. 87  This 
presence of French interests at the level of one of the key decision-making bodies is 
critical. The Board of Directors administers the Central Bank and ensures its functioning. 
In addition to their presence in Board, Paris has a right of veto in that the Board of BEAC 
constitutes a quorum only if each participating state is represented by at least one director 
(the BCEAO can only make changes to its statutes if there is an unanimous agreement). 
Perhaps even more serious, the veto right for France also extends to the appointment of 
the Governor of BEAC, as Article 50, Paragraph 1 of the Articles of BEAC states that the 
Governor can only be appointed by the Conference of Heads of State of CEMAC, upon 
the proposal of the Ministerial Committee of the L’Union Monétaire de l’Afrique 
Centrale (the organ responsible for monetary policy) and after the unanimous approval of 
the Administrative Council. 
 At the BCEAO, the Board of Directors is made up of the Governor of the Central 
Bank, a member appointed by each of the Governments of the UEMOA member states 
and a member appointed by the state that guarantees the convertibility of the common 
currency i.e. France. This arrangement is very similar to the BEAC and Article 82 of the 
statutes of the BCEAO stresses that any changes in its own statutes and other key 
  
decisions must be reached with the complete unanimity of the Board of Directors. Though 
African members are in the majority on the Board of Directors of both currencies, they 
have no real control in the management of operations without French say-so. As 
Dominique Kounkou notes, this arrangement confirms classically to ‘la théorie des 
traités inégaux’ i.e. the theory of unequal treaties which were intrinsic to colonialism.88  
 Ironically, the greatest losers out of the CFA arrangement are those with positive 
Operations Account balances (i.e. those with the most disciplined fiscal policy) and who 
trade outside of the CFA zones. Although French monopolization of the CFA market has 
noticeably diminished in the wake of post-2000 investment by BRICS countries, it is well 
documented that the ready convertibility of the CFA in conjunction with the fact that the 
French Treasury has the sole obligation of this convertibility, means French corporations 
receive an unfair competitive advantage. 89  The convertibility has also encouraged 
massive capital flight from the CFA zone, again to the benefit of France, which is the 
main destination of capital leaving the zone.   
Indeed, capital flight from the franc zone has been enormous, having a 
demonstrable negative effect on poverty reduction.90 A detailed study by Ameth Saloum 
Ndiaye of Université Cheikh Anta Diop de Dakar91 has demonstrated quite clearly that 
between 1970 and 2010, ten of the fourteen CFA countries recorded net capital 
outflows.92 Among these ten, four faced capital flight with an amount surpassing $10 
billion. At the top of this list was Côte d’Ivoire, with c. $40 billion leaving the country. 
Gabon lost c. $23 billion, Congo-Brazzaville $20 billion, and Cameroon c. $11 billion. 
All of the six countries in CEMAC experienced capital flight of varying quantities, while 
only four countries in UEMOA recorded on balance capital inflows (Burkina Faso, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Togo). Capital flight from the franc zone is generated 
primarily by corporations via trade misinvoicing, corrupt officials in Africa and by well-
positioned individuals banking in France, all facilitated by the convertibility of the CFA, 
guaranteed by Paris. The net result is that between 1970 and 2010, UEMOA saw $19.4 
billion leave the zone whilst CEMAC witnessed $67.5 billion exiting overseas.93  Of 
note, ‘In Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon…and Togo, investing flight capital in domestic 
economies over the same period would have increased the annual rate of poverty 
reduction by more than 10 percentage points’.94  
  
 
The CFA Helps Deepens Underdevelopment 
It is apparent that the CFA acts as mechanism that helps promotes inertia and 
underdevelopment for its member states. This is deeply problematic given that there is a 
desperate need to promote structural change, ‘defined as an increase in the share of 
industry or services in the economy, or as the diversification and sophistication of 
exports…or as the shift of workers from sectors with low labour productivity to those 
with high labour productivity’ in Africa.95 The question of structural transformation is at 
the heart of the development project on the continent, as only returns on value chains will 
enable African economies to exchange goods and services that are sufficiently diversified 
and that may allow the possibility of increasing value on exports. Here a number of issues 
arise.  
Firstly, the economies of the CFA zone experience major problems regarding the 
price competitiveness of their exports, due to the fixed exchange rate with the euro 
which, as has been mentioned, makes the CFA an overvalued currency.96 Senegal, for 
example, recorded an overvaluation of the real exchange rate estimated at between 10% 
and 35% in 2013-2014.97 The strength of the CFA then acts as an effective tax on exports 
and a subsidy on imports. In a study of 12 countries, It has been found that on average 
CFA countries’ currencies were overvalued by 31 percent in 1993 (just prior to the 
devaluation), with Cameroon’s real exchange rate being overvalued by a colossal 78 
percent.98 A later, post-devaluation study, found that the average overvaluation for the 
CFA zone was 25%.99 
The burden on exports then makes it extremely difficult to nurture any infant 
industries that may contribute to diversification, setting aside the fact that foreign 
reserves that may be deployed to do this are kept in the Operations Account in Paris. It is 
well-known that African economies exhibit very low levels of diversification and that by 
all measures there has been limited diversification of African economies.100 The CFA 
countries are particularly problematic in this respect. The table below looks at the 
Concentration Index and the Diversification Index of the CFA zone in comparison with 
other regions. The Concentration Index (also named the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index), 
is a measure of the degree of product concentration. The methodology obtains data values 
  
between 0 and 1, with an index value closer to 1 indicating a country’s trade is highly 
concentrated on a few products. The Diversification Index measures the absolute 
deviation of the trade structure of a country from the global structure. A value closer to 1 
indicates greater divergence from the world pattern. 
 
Concentration and Diversification indices101  
Region 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015  
 CI DI CI DI CI DI CI DI CI DI 
CEMAC 0.5 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.8 
UEMOA 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.8 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.3 0.7 
COMESA 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 
EAC 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.6 
SADC  0.1 0.5 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 
 
The above date demonstrates that both CFA zones are significantly less diversified than 
other important regional blocs in Africa, whilst the Concentration Index for both is poor, 
with CEMAC particularly acute, when compared with other regional blocs. Furthermore, 
as one study has found, the growth rate of industrial exports in the CFA zones is below 
that of other African countries.102  
 In this regard, it is important to consider the critique by Bruno Tinel, economist 
at the Sorbonne, who notes that while the GDP of the CFA zones represent less than 10% 
of France's total GDP, operating the currency and guaranteeing its convertibility remains  
a manageable prospect for Paris. Yet within this system is an in-built rationale within 
CFA to ensure the underdevelopment of the African economies, lest their economic size 
become too unwieldy for France to oversee: 
Si les économies des deux sous-régions CFA venaient à se développer et à grossir 
trop vite, la France serait moins en mesure d’assumer ce paternalisme monétaire 
à leur égard. En des termes moins polémiques: ce système est faisable tant que les 




It is not necessary to enter into the realms of conspiracy theories to see the logic behind 
such an assertion.  
 
The CFA as a Currency Union and Economic Commonsense  
An intriguing phenomena regarding the CFA zone is that as currency areas, they do not 
actually make economic sense, given the structures of their membership countries. When 
discussing currency unions in general, two advantages are routinely cited.104 The first is 
the reduction in transaction costs, in that the expenses involved in exchanging currencies 
are averted as a unitary currency is employed for all intraregional commerce. 
Supplementary costs such as may be incurred on futures markets to hedge against risks in 
exchange rates, as well as information costs, are also avoided. Obviously, the lessening of 
transaction costs is limited to dealings within a currency union.105 The relative gains of 
reduced transactions costs is consequently significant if and when intraregional trade is 
substantial as a percentage of total trade. Weak intraregional trade negates the 
advantage.106 
Secondly, exchange rate risks accompanying future capital flows in foreign 
currencies is avoided. Due to fluctuations in the exchange rate, it is likely that future 
receipts denominated in foreign currencies decline in value in the local currency. Having 
one nominated coinage for a currency union removes this exchange rate risk for 
intraregional trade as expenditures and earnings from intraregional trade will be held in 
the currency of the zone. 107  Again, low intraregional trade makes this ostensible 
advantage of a currency union less relevant. In short, the literature on optimal currency 
areas (OCAs) states that an OCA is classified as a region typified by factor mobility, 
economic interdependence, sectoral diversification and flexibility in wages and 
prices.108If one looks at the level of intraregional trade within the two CFA zones, it is 
apparent that neither fulfil OCA conditions.109 CEMAC has the lowest proportion of 
intra-regional trade in Africa, at just 2.1% in 2014 while UEMOA’s intra-regional trade 
has stagnated. In contrast, the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) fare significantly better; in 2014, SADC had the 
highest proportion of intra-regional trade at 19.3% of its total trade, followed by the EAC 
at 18.4%.  
  
 
Intra-regional trade in Africa’s regional economic communities as a percentage of 
total trade110  
 2000  2010 2014  
CEMAC  1.19 2.74 2.08  
COMESA 4.82 7.36 11.00  
EAC  17.73 18.65 18.37  
ECOWAS  8.91  8.27 8.92  
SADC  11.73 18.18 19.34  
UEMOA  15.24 15.24  15.30  
 
As BNP Paribas notes: 
The CFA franc zone has not fulfilled all its objectives by a long shot, particularly 
in terms of regional integration. Trade within the WAEMU barely exceeds 10% 
of total trade flows, and what is more, this percentage has been relatively stable 
over the long term. Intra-zone trade within the CEMAC is even smaller.111 
 
This directly contradicts the official view of the Banque de France which incorrectly 
claims that ‘monetary union has strengthened regional solidarity. The existence of a 
common currency, combined with free capital flows, is a factor that promotes the 
development of trade within both the WAEMU and the CEMAC’.112 
Given that the two zones demonstrably do not fulfill the notional conditions that 
may give rise to an optimal usage of a currency union, it would be apposite to then 
discuss some of the disadvantages of currency unions. Unfortunately, the CFA zone 
fulfills all of these shortcomings. Firstly, currency unions remove the possibility of 
member states utilizing exchange rate adjustments as a policy mechanism within the 
zone. Members cannot alter the nominal exchange rate, which may result in problems 
vis-a-vis balance of payments. In normal economies (non-currency unions), the real 
exchange rate is influenced by vagaries in wages and prices, as well as labour 
productivity. This is not possible in a currency union such as CFA. Secondly, in currency 
unions, monetary policy is centralized and state-level monetary policy is not possible. It 
  
has been demonstrated that if countries are confronted with identical shocks, they require 
different policy responses to these shocks due to the differences in their economic 
positions.113 This is not possible within the CFA zone and, in any case, monetary policy 
is de facto controlled by the former colonial power, with a different key rate for the 
BEAC (3.5%) and BCEAO (2.5%). Thirdly, monetary integration necessitates both the 
harmonization of inflation rates and the real cost increases within members’ states. 
Increases in remunerations relative to labour productivity in a member country will 
stimulate joblessness and will likely trigger factor shifts to higher productivity economies 
within the bloc. The fiscal and monetary discipline imposed on the CFA zone has meant 
that member countries have been constrained in their spending on social provisions. Not 
for nothing does Agbohou note that ‘monetary bondage leads to subjugation and 
underdevelopment’.114   
Equally, large-scale disparities in income between member states of a union is 
problematic. A look at the per capita income of the member states within the two CFA 
zones reveals that this is indeed the case: 
 
Per capita income, 2014 (in $)115 
UEMOA country Per capita income CEMAC country Per capita income 
Benin  900 Cameroon 1350 
Burkina Faso 680 CAR 320 
Côte d’Ivoire 1450  Chad 980 
Guinea-Bissau 590 Congo-B 2720 
 Mali  790 Equatorial Guinea  16028  
Niger 420 Gabon 10410 
Senegal 1020  
Togo 550 
 
Monetary integration in a situation as depicted above, encourages regional imbalances 
and intensifies inequalities within zones. This will then likely encourage migration within 
such unions to economies where per capita income is higher and employment 
  
opportunities exist, which in turn may kindle societal tensions. The history of Côte 
d’Ivoire is a clear example of this trend.116 
The compensations of monetary unions such as found in the CFA zone are 
significant only when intraregional trade is relatively large. This is not the case in either 
CFA zones.117 Even the European Union admits that ‘Taking the literature on the optimal 
currency area (“OCA”) as a reference, the CFA franc zone countries would hardly qualify 
for an OCA given their low product diversification’. 118  Weak intra-zonal trade is a 
recurrent feature of both zones (CEMAC being worse in this regard than UEMOA) and 
the practical extraversion of the CFA zones’ economies makes it almost pointless to share 
the same currency.119 But share it they do.  
 
Conclusion 
If dependency is a condition that acts to limit the developmental possibilities of 
subordinate economies and ‘a situation in which the economy of a certain group of 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy’ (Dos 
Santos, 1971: 226), then the CFA is a classic example. It is undoubtable that the CFA 
encourages capital flight and corruption, whilst preventing effective economic 
diversification and perpetuating commodity dependence: 
[T]he CFA franc is an obstacle to the development of Africa countries. The 
operating mechanisms of the franc zone and the monetary policies imposed on 
those countries are largely responsible for the failure of the CFA franc to be an 
instrument of development. An illustration of this failure is reflected in the 
economic and social realities of those countries, almost all of which are ranked as 
least developed countries (LDCs) or as heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPCs).120  
 
Consequently, the CFA zone countries have been effectively locked into a “comparative 
advantage” of supplying cheap commodities. That this advantage accrues to Paris and its 
allies across Africa is quite evident:  
[U]n taux de change qui est surévalué et qui, par conséquent, handicape les 
exportations des pays africains, mais, par contre, donne un avantage aux classes 
  
possédantes locales parce qu’elles peuvent bénéficier d’une importation facile, 
non contrôlée, des biens de consommation de semi-luxe, disons, qui ne devraient 
pas être prioritaires dans les importations de ces pays. C’est, par conséquent, un 
instrument qui renforce ce que l’on appelle le néocolonialisme dans le langage 
general.121 
 
This overvaluation has continued. If 1999 is taken as the base year, the nominal 
appreciation rate relative to the US dollar stood at 24.2% in 2011, after hitting a high of 
27.3% in 2008. After the devaluation in 1994, the bulk of CFA member countries 
experienced a gradual appreciation, to the point of attaining an overvaluation, from 2004 
onwards.122 
However, mainstream analysis of the technical aspects of the CFA miss the point: 
‘Disputes about the optimal exchange rate can be misleading. The true value of the CFA 
franc is not economic. It is political. For the member states of the franc zone have no 
national monetary policy of their own. The making of monetary policy for these countries 
remains with France’.123 It is the symbolic manifestation of a hangover from colonialism 
that is at the heart of most critiques of the CFA: ‘La grande violence symbolique du 
maintien très visible d'un rapport colonial doit être soulignée. Les symboles, ça 
compte’.124   
Indeed, scrutiny of the CFA zone has been largely dominated by orthodox 
economists who, while able to provide technical analyses of its functioning, cannot 
account for its longevity when based on “rational” economics. This is because the CFA 
is, first and foremost, a political instrument: as one analysis by economists admits:  
The CFA countries constitute a puzzle from the standpoint of OCA analysis. They 
have successfully maintained a currency union despite their failure to meet a 
number of important OCA criteria. This can be explained by several drawbacks of 
the OCA analysis, the stronger coming from its “problem of inconclusiveness” 
and its omission of political considerations.125  
 
The ‘omission of political considerations’ can be explained in that it raises troubling 
questions about French policy in Africa and the complicity of the elites of Françafrique. 
  
Indeed, institutions and norms associated with the CFA reproduce a hierarchical 
relationship between France and its former colonies. From the African side i.e. the 
normal people, ‘The benefits from economic integration within each of the two monetary 
unions of the CFA franc zone, and even more so between them, remain remarkably 
low’.126 The structures of the Paris-village du continent noir, of which the CFA is the 
most obvious, continue. While the military interventions by France may be the most 
dramatic, the more mundane economic constraints are far more damaging and amount to 
‘a voluntary surrender of sovereignty’.127  
In short, the CFA arrangements continue to exhibit structural expressions of 
underdevelopment and dependency, in that the CFA serves as an instrument to suck 
capital and economic surplus out of former (largely French) colonial territories in Africa. 
In an evaluation of the CFA, Célestin Monga wryly noted: 
Looking at the economic challenges facing African policymakers today—at a 
time when 1 billion people still live below a very low income poverty rate 
(arbitrarily) set at US$1.25 a day—it is hard not to wonder about their decision-
making process on crucial issues such as the choice of an exchange rate, and their 
increasing willingness to join or create monetary unions which they hope will 
help their economies escape from perpetual misery. 
…Perhaps a hundred years from now when future economic historians use the 
tools of behavioral economics to analyze the policy decisions made by the African 
policymakers—especially their either passive, uninformed, or stubborn 
willingness to join, remain in, or create monetary unions that clearly hampered 
their already difficult quest for prosperity—the rationality underlying the choices 
made will seem clearer than they are today.128 
 
It is of course important in this respect to acknowledge African agency in the CFA story. 
Francophone leaders on the continent are well-known for their attachment to Paris, 
manipulating relations for the sake of their own regimes’ survival in policies that fit Jean-
François Bayart’s concept of extraversion. 129  Equally, the “cover” provided to these 
selfsame elites by the CFA arrangements is critical. Such leaders can be sure that Paris 
will always be there to protect their mistakes, which at the same time serves as a 
  
disincentive to make structural reforms. It is no wonder that the CFA countries are 
lagging in terms of governance indicator, as the 2018 Ibrahim Index of African 
Governances attests. The current African average governance score is 49.9/100. Fully 
nine out of the fourteen CFA countries (all of those within CEMAC) are either below the 
continental average or barely pass this (already low) marker. Given the intense political 
role that Paris exercises in these countries, this is surely an indictment of French policy in 
much of Africa. 
 
Governance Indicators (out of 100)130 
UEMOA country  CEMAC country  
Benin  58.7 Cameroon 46.2 
Burkina Faso 57.1 CAR 29.5 
Côte d’Ivoire 54.5 Chad 35.4 
Guinea-Bissau 40.2 Congo-B 39.8 
 Mali  50.1 Equatorial Guinea  30.9 
Niger 51.2 Gabon 42.4 
Senegal 63.3  
Togo 50.5 
 
Only when the leaders of these countries become an obvious liability to French interests 
will they be discarded. But as long as they play the game they are generally safe.       
Yet it is not enough to blame Françafrique entirely on Paris: postcolonial 
Francophone Africa has seen an active participation by its governing elites in the 
processes that have continued the continent’s dependent position within the global 
system—what Kako Nubukpo has referred to as a move from imposed extraversion to 
chosen extraversion.131 Indeed, while ‘Dependency could not be more evident than in the 
continued use of a metropolitan currency’, this situation has been preserved by the 
consent of the ruling elites of le village franco-africain. 132  
Given the insecurity of most African regimes, focusing on survival is key and the 
Françafrique regime, of which the CFA is a central element, is an excellent example of 
how African elites are responsible in certain ways for the perpetuation of dependency 
  
relations. 133  This was neatly encapsulated by the former president of Gabon, Omar 
Bongo, who noted that ‘Le Gabon sans la France, c’est une voiture sans chauffeur, la 
France sans le Gabon, c’est une voiture sans carburant’. 134  It is this reality of 
dependency that Golan alluded to her in original analysis of the mystery of how France 
gets away with it.  
Yet, at some point, the CFA arrangements will have to be transformed. This is not 
only because of the deleterious economic conditions that are fostered within the zones, 
and all the other technical arguments made against the currency, but also because it is a 
residue of a colonial past that is now under increasing scrutiny and critiqued by many 
within the zone themselves. In 1956, Kwame Nkrumah wrote that ‘The best way of 
learning to be an independent sovereign state is to be an independent sovereign state’.135 
Sixty years later, the CFA countries may be moving towards this radical option.  
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